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Robert J. Bunker and Hakim Hazim 
 
The contention being made is that governmental officials are downplaying a threat to the US 
homeland—that compromised of a small, yet virulent, component of domestic radical Islamic 
insurgency derived from the actions of one and two man cells. While a well intended policy, 
such actions may be in actuality setting up our nation for some sort of disaster down the road. 
 
With this said, no overarching conspiracy is implied to be taking place with the suppression of 
this threat, but rather that incremental policies and decisions appear to be promoting this public 
policy. The motivations behind such policies surely vary but appear to be centered on not 
unnecessarily alarming the American public or causing them further fear and consternation. With 
the burden of economic hardships, high levels of unemployment, bankruptcies, and foreclosures, 
health concerns over the H1N1 virus, and the other trials and tribulations of today’s world, the 
American public is, in a sense, being protected for its own good. Further, due to both 
considerations of ‘political correctness’ on one hand and appropriate concerns over ‘witch hunts’ 
and Islam-bashing on the other, any discussion of domestic Islamic self-radicalization quickly 
becomes a highly politicized topic. As a result, it is officially better to attribute any form of 
violence undertaken due to self-radicalization as a manifestation of mental health issues or 
heightened emotional states instead of being symptomatic of radical Islamic yearnings derived 
from one’s own internalized metric of rationality. 
 
One may argue that, in order to ensure an appropriate homeland security posture, the perception 
of threat and the actual threat that exists should always be closely intertwined. Not only should 
the American government be accurate in its understanding of what the actual threats to homeland 
security are but it is critical that the American public also be informed and educated in a similar 
manner. The greater the divergence between the threat reality that exists and the perception of 
that reality held by the American public, the greater the potential for some sort of disaster to take 
place. 
 
Disaster in this usage is derived from any one of two domestic outcomes taking place. The first 
outcome is that of a “blindside attack”. The American public, ignorant or ill informed of a threat, 
are literally stupefied by one or more terrorist incidents. High levels of terror and disruption 
ensue and the average citizen is left reeling, unable to come to grips with what has just 
transpired. The second outcome is that of an “overreaction” to a threat that has suddenly made 
itself known in the eyes of the American public. Mob behavior, senseless violence, and the 
passage of draconian policies and measures—such as the loss of personal freedoms in exchange 
for higher levels of security—are all possible second order effects that may take place from such 
an outcome. 
 
In support of the contention that the threat of a small yet virulent component of domestic radical 
Islamic insurgency is being downplayed by US governmental officials, what evidence can be 
offered up for judgment? Some specific incidents are as follows: 
 
¾ CIA Headquarters, Virginia, 25 January 1993.  Mir Aimal Kasi was a Pakistani 
immigrant who killed 2 and wounded 3 in his active shooter attack outside of the CIA 
Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Kasi said that he had decided to kill CIA employees 
after he purchased an AK-47 assault rifle. His roommate told police that Kasi would get 
angry over watching CNN reports of Muslims being killed in the Middle East by US 
forces. During his trial, his attorneys stated that he had a history of mental illness. He was 
executed by lethal injection in November 2002. 
  
¾ Empire State Building, New York, 24 February 1997. Ali Hassan Abu Kamal shot seven 
people on the observation deck of the Empire State Building. He held a passport from 
Ramallah, the West Bank, and was reportedly overheard shouting “Are you from Egypt?” 
before opening fire upon the innocent bystanders. Kamal shot himself before the 
authorities could reach him and died 5 hours later in the hospital. Kamal’s motive for the 
shootings were to punish the US for its support of Israel, according to his daughter who 
worked for the UN. 
 
¾ Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), California, 4 July 2002. While standing in line 
at the counter of El Al Airlines, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened fire and killed two 
people and wounded 4 others. Security personnel subsequently killed Hadayet. The 
attack, oddly enough, took place on his birthday. US authorities were quick to point out 
that this was an isolated incident and merely a criminal act; the Israeli government had a 
very different view of the matter. US officials later quietly agreed this was a terrorist act. 
 
¾ Beltway, Washington DC, Maryland, and Virginia, October 2002. John Allen  
Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo targeted and killed over 10 people in what became 
known as the Beltway sniper attacks. Muhammad, a Nation of Islam convert, followed a 
do-it-yourself version of Islam that contained strong elements of Black Nationalism. 
Muhammad’s military marksmanship training and affinity for Al Qaeda proved to be a 
deadly combination. The younger Malvo was apparently brainwashed by Muhammad and 
believed he was engaging in God’s work. 
 
¾ University of Oklahoma in Norman, Oklahoma, 1 October 2005.  Joel Henry Hinrichs III 
was killed by the detonation of an improvised explosive device (IED) in his backpack 
outside of the packed Oklahoma Memorial Stadium on a Saturday evening. No one else 
was injured. Hinrich’s case is shrouded in mystery and conspiracy with purported links to 
radical Islamic literature found on his computer. The IED was constructed from 
triacetone triperoxide (TATP), a highly unstable explosive commonly used by Palestinian 
suicide bombers. The investigation into his death was quickly closed and ruled by 
officials to be nothing more than a suicide attempt by a troubled student. 
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¾ University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 3 March 2006. Mohammed 
Reza Taheri-azar is an Iranian-American born citizen who drove a Jeep Cherokee into a 
crowd of students at the University of North Carolina. His intent was to avenge the death 
of Muslims worldwide and to punish the United States. Mohammed stated that he looked 
forward to defending himself in court and sharing the law of Allah. In a letter he wrote, 
he said one of his role models was Mohamed Atta—a 9/11 ringleader. He was convicted 
of 9 counts of attempted murder and 9 counts of assault with a deadly weapon. He is 
currently serving a 33 year term in prison. 
  
¾ Seattle Jewish Federation, Washington, 28 July 2006.  Active shooter Nafeed Afzal Haq 
killed 1 woman and wounded 5 others at the Seattle Jewish Federation in the Beltown 
neighborhood of Seattle. He shouted “ I am a Muslim, angry at Israel” before engaging in 
personal Jihad. This incident is unique as Haq was of Pakistani descent, disavowed Islam 
to become a Christian, and apparently later reconverted to Islam. The process of self-
radicalization combined with Haq being mentally ill— he probably suffered from a 
bipolar disorder— resulted in a deadly mix. 
 
¾ Little Rock, Arkansas, 1 June 2009. Carlos Bledsoe, AKA Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad, is accused of shooting two Army recruiters, killing 1 in the process at an 
Army Recruiting Center. This was a premeditated act that included the scouting of other 
recruiting centers, a day care, a post office, and a Baptist church in at least five states. 
Police reports say that he had political and religious motivation for engaging in his acts of 
violence. Muhammad is a Muslim convert who had recently returned from Yemen, a 
known Al Qaeda base of operations, and was under investigation for his extremist 
activities. 
 
¾ Fort Hood, Texas, 5 November 2009. Nidal Malik Hasan is the Fort Hood murderer who 
yelled “Allah Akbar” (God is Great) as he proceeded to kill 13 and wound dozens more 
in an active shooter incident. He openly declared his disagreement with the war in 
Afghanistan and was upset over his upcoming deployment. Many warning signs were 
ignored concerning his behavior including his open presentation of radical Islamic 
materials and his taking of additional small arms training which was at variance with his 
Medical Corps occupational branch specialty. Immediately following the incident the 
media, officials, and other Muslims declared him to be a mentally ill person or mad man 
whose actions had nothing to do with his radical beliefs. 
 
What is most intriguing about this pattern of omission is that it is derived from one-to-two man 
terrorist based incidents that were not interdicted. In almost all of these incidents, the blood of 
US citizens actually flowed on the street. When a larger terrorist cell is uncovered by federal 
officials, typically while still in the planning phases with its members arrested and then 
prosecuted, it is then considered part of the bonafide radical Islamic terrorist threat to our 
homeland. One and two man terrorist cells who adhere to principals of self-radicalization, in 
what can be considered a form of ‘leaderless resistance’, and view themselves as individual 
‘Soldiers of Allah’ apparently do not fit the appropriate official threat criteria. Good news 
concerning foiled terrorist plots is thus broadcast while terrorism related bad news is suppressed 
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and censored and becomes attributed to the actions of mentally unstable individuals. Such 
governmental tactics are commonly used in wartime and none would argue the fact that radical 
Islamic networks are engaged in a holy war that has now spread to many areas of the globe. Yet, 
as a result, an integral component of the radical Islamic insurgency that is taking place on 
American soil, while embryonic and still relatively small and manageable, is being significantly 
downplayed to the public. 
 
As afore mentioned, this has potentially disastrous and possibly even strategic implications. Not 
only are we making ourselves nationally vulnerable to blindside attacks and subsequent public 
policy overreaction but government officials may actually delude themselves strategically due to 
their suppression of this domestic radical Islamic threat component. It is far easier to penetrate 
and compromise larger radical Islamic cells, which to date have been basically somewhat 
incompetent and inept ‘gangs of guys’ seeking to engage in terrorist acts, than to identify one 
and two man radical Islamic leaderless resistance cells. Those small cells have been achieving 
operational success while the larger cells have since 9-11 thus far been interdicted domestically. 
 
The violent activities of lone wolves and two man bands are extremely difficult to track and 
prevent. One must not forget that there are a number of people within the US who are willing to 
participate in open violence against the government. Zealous operatives actively seek martyrdom 
that will guarantee paradise or at the very least an opportunity to live on in the memories of the 
people they believe they are fighting for. Radicalization is a state of mind that can prove lethal 
when people act against their country in the name of their faith. It would be a mistake to discount 
the actions of these individuals as nothing more than the motivation of “mad men” lashing out at 
the world. 
 
The great concern from a strategic perspective is that governmental officials will start to drink 
their own ‘spiked punch’ and delude themselves into believing that the many terrorist incidents 
listed in this essay are in actuality the actions of mentally unstable and delusional individuals and 
nothing more. This would mean that our domestic intelligence and interdiction capabilities are 
performing flawlessly with the ensuing pats on the back,  ‘atta-boys’, and political kudos being 
exchanged.  Such a refusal to candidly acknowledge the ones and twos radical Islamic threat 
domestically is somewhat reminiscent of 1990s roles and missions debate in the US Army 
concerning Operations Other Than War (OOTW). 
 
That debate centered on to what extent the Army should engage in non-conventional warfare 
operations—the view then held by many was that OOTW should not be a real Army mission of 
concern since it had nothing to do with actual warfighting. In retrospect, it eventually became 
understood that, while OOTW had nothing to do with warfare between states, it in actuality was 
an umbrella concept that included non-state warfare. That other form of warfighting involving 
terrorists, insurgents, cartel enforcers, and assorted criminal-entities has since gone on to 
dominate contemporary military deployments and patterns of conflict. This was not necessarily 
the mission the Army or the other armed services desired but it is the one that they got. It was 
ultimately very beneficial for the Army that the OOTW debate took place. 
 
What is now needed is a governmental and federal law enforcement debate focusing on the 
broader spectrum of the domestic radical Islamic threat. This new debate on ‘Ones and Twos’ 
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should revisit conventional views on terrorist groups and their organization. Specifically, while 
non-state warfare can be waged by larger radical Islamic cells, i.e. those which have been 
successfully interdicted such as the 2002 Lackawanna, New York (Muktar al-Bakri et al); 2005 
Lodi, California (Hayat family et al); 2007 Fort Dix, New Jersey (Duka family et al); and 2009 
New York (Najibullah Zazi et al) groups, it must also ask whether cells composed of ones and 
twos are not now also part of this threat spectrum. If ignored and simply labeled as ‘other than 
war (or terrorist)’ incidents, we may find ourselves with a homeland security capability superbly 
suited to combat large (and more conventional) cells belonging to the radical Islamic network but 
not the smaller and to date more effective ones. Such roles and missions would thus be deemed 
outside of current counter-terrorism operations even though they too may become not necessarily 
the mission US governmental agencies and personnel desire but the one that they end up with. 
 
In the process, some consideration should be given to openly informing and educating the 
American public about the broadening radical Islamic threat spectrum. As a free and democratic 
people, some of who individually may end up in future crosshairs on American soil, we at the 
very least owe them this. In fact, it is best to build additional bonds of trust now, treat our people 
with some level of maturity, and tell them like it is. Basically, we’ve had a number of past 
incidents in which self-radicalized individuals have professed loyalty to Al Qaeda or to other 
radical Islamic entities or simply tenets and we expect more incidents to follow. As a nation, we 
recognize these threat potentials, even one that is currently very minor and has taken place only 
sporadically, and are doing everything in our power to address the process of Islamic self-
radicalization now taking place on American soil and the ensuing violence that comes with it. 
Far better to promote this public policy than the other one that ignores an issue which has the 
potential to grow and continues to attribute an increasing number of active shootings, and quite 
possibly future bombings, to mentally ill individuals— individuals who just coincidentally also 
spout out radical Islamic rhetoric and doctrines. 
 
Authors’ Note—As this essay went to publication, some official views on domestic Islamic 
radicalization may now be finally changing due to the recent Fort Hood shooting incident. See 
Sebastian Rotella “U.S. Sees Homegrown Muslim Extremism as Rising Threat.” Los Angeles 
Times. Monday, December 7, 2009. p. A1, A13. 
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